/**
* For jQuery versions less than 3.5.0, this replaces the jQuery.htmlPrefilter()
* function with one that fixes these security vulnerabilities while also
* retaining the pre-3.5.0 behavior where it's safe to do so.
* - https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-11022
* - https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-11023
*
* Additionally, for jQuery versions that do not have a jQuery.htmlPrefilter()
* function (1.x prior to 1.12 and 2.x prior to 2.2), this adds it, and
* extends the functions that need to call it to do so.
*
* Drupal core's jQuery version is 1.4.4, but jQuery Update can provide a
* different version, so this covers all versions between 1.4.4 and 3.4.1.
* The GitHub links in the code comments below link to jQuery 1.5 code, because
* 1.4.4 isn't on GitHub, but the referenced code didn't change from 1.4.4 to
* 1.5.
*/
(function (jQuery) {
// Parts of this backport differ by jQuery version.
var versionParts = jQuery.fn.jquery.split('.');
var majorVersion = parseInt(versionParts[0]);
var minorVersion = parseInt(versionParts[1]);
// No backport is needed if we're already on jQuery 3.5 or higher.
if ( (majorVersion > 3) || (majorVersion === 3 && minorVersion >= 5) ) {
return;
}
// Prior to jQuery 3.5, jQuery converted XHTML-style self-closing tags to
// their XML equivalent: e.g., "<div />" to "<div></div>". This is
// problematic for several reasons, including that it's vulnerable to XSS
// attacks. However, since this was jQuery's behavior for many years, many
// Drupal modules and jQuery plugins may be relying on it. Therefore, we
// preserve that behavior, but for a limited set of tags only, that we believe
// to not be vulnerable. This is the set of HTML tags that satisfy all of the
// following conditions:
// - In DOMPurify's list of HTML tags. If an HTML tag isn't safe enough to
// appear in that list, then we don't want to mess with it here either.
// @see https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/blob/2.0.11/dist/purify.js#L128
// - A normal element (not a void, template, text, or foreign element).
// @see https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/syntax.html#elements-2
// - An element that is still defined by the current HTML specification
// (not a deprecated element), because we do not want to rely on how
// browsers parse deprecated elements.
// @see https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTML/Element
// - Not 'html', 'head', or 'body', because this pseudo-XHTML expansion is
// designed for fragments, not entire documents.
// - Not 'colgroup', because due to an idiosyncrasy of jQuery's original
// regular expression, it didn't match on colgroup, and we don't want to
// introduce a behavior change for that.
var selfClosingTagsToReplace = [
'a', 'abbr', 'address', 'article', 'aside', 'audio', 'b', 'bdi', 'bdo',
'blockquote', 'button', 'canvas', 'caption', 'cite', 'code', 'data',
'datalist', 'dd', 'del', 'details', 'dfn', 'div', 'dl', 'dt', 'em',
'fieldset', 'figcaption', 'figure', 'footer', 'form', 'h1', 'h2', 'h3',
'h4', 'h5', 'h6', 'header', 'hgroup', 'i', 'ins', 'kbd', 'label', 'legend',
'li', 'main', 'map', 'mark', 'menu', 'meter', 'nav', 'ol', 'optgroup',
'option', 'output', 'p', 'picture', 'pre', 'progress', 'q', 'rp', 'rt',
'ruby', 's', 'samp', 'section', 'select', 'small', 'source', 'span',
'strong', 'sub', 'summary', 'sup', 'table', 'tbody', 'td', 'tfoot', 'th',
'thead', 'time', 'tr', 'u', 'ul', 'var', 'video'
];
// Define regular expressions for <TAG/> and <TAG ATTRIBUTES/>. Doing this as
// two expressions makes it easier to target <a/> without also targeting
// every tag that starts with "a".
var xhtmlRegExpGroup = '(' + selfClosingTagsToReplace.join('|') + ')';
var whitespace = '[\\x20\\t\\r\\n\\f]';
var rxhtmlTagWithoutSpaceOrAttributes = new RegExp('<' + xhtmlRegExpGroup + '\\/>', 'gi');
var rxhtmlTagWithSpaceAndMaybeAttributes = new RegExp('<' + xhtmlRegExpGroup + '(' + whitespace + '[^>]*)\\/>', 'gi');
// jQuery 3.5 also fixed a vulnerability for when </select> appears within
// an <option> or <optgroup>, but it did that in local code that we can't
// backport directly. Instead, we filter such cases out. To do so, we need to
// determine when jQuery would otherwise invoke the vulnerable code, which it
// uses this regular expression to determine. The regular expression changed
// for version 3.0.0 and changed again for 3.4.0.
// @see https://github.com/jquery/jquery/blob/1.5/jquery.js#L4958
// @see https://github.com/jquery/jquery/blob/3.0.0/dist/jquery.js#L4584
// @see https://github.com/jquery/jquery/blob/3.4.0/dist/jquery.js#L4712
var rtagName;
if (majorVersion < 3) {
rtagName = /<([\w:]+)/;
}
else if (minorVersion < 4) {
rtagName = /<([a-z][^\/\0>\x20\t\r\n\f]+)/i;
}
else {
rtagName = /<([a-z][^\/\0>\x20\t\r\n\f]*)/i;
}
// The regular expression that jQuery uses to determine which self-closing
// tags to expand to open and close tags. This is vulnerable, because it
// matches all tag names except the few excluded ones. We only use this
// expression for determining vulnerability. The expression changed for
// version 3, but we only need to check for vulnerability in versions 1 and 2,
// so we use the expression from those versions.
// @see https://github.com/jquery/jquery/blob/1.5/jquery.js#L4957
var rxhtmlTag = /<(?!area|br|col|embed|hr|img|input|link|meta|param)(([\w:]+)[^>]*)\/>/gi;
jQuery.extend({
htmlPrefilter: function (html) {
// This is how jQuery determines the first tag in the HTML.
// @see https://github.com/jquery/jquery/blob/1.5/jquery.js#L5521
var tag = ( rtagName.exec( html ) || [ "", "" ] )[ 1 ].toLowerCase();
// It is not valid HTML for <option> or <optgroup> to have <select> as
// either a descendant or sibling, and attempts to inject one can cause
// XSS on jQuery versions before 3.5. Since this is invalid HTML and a
// possible XSS attack, reject the entire string.
// @see https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-11023
if ((tag === 'option' || tag === 'optgroup') && html.match(/<\/?select/i)) {
html = '';
}
// Retain jQuery's prior to 3.5 conversion of pseudo-XHTML, but for only
// the tags in the `selfClosingTagsToReplace` list defined above.
// @see https://github.com/jquery/jquery/blob/1.5/jquery.js#L5518
// @see https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-11022
html = html.replace(rxhtmlTagWithoutSpaceOrAttributes, "<$1></$1>");
html = html.replace(rxhtmlTagWithSpaceAndMaybeAttributes, "<$1$2></$1>");
// Prior to jQuery 1.12 and 2.2, this function gets called (via code later
// in this file) in addition to, rather than instead of, the unsafe
// expansion of self-closing tags (including ones not in the list above).
// We can't prevent that unsafe expansion from running, so instead we
// check to make sure that it doesn't affect the DOM returned by the
// browser's parsing logic. If it does affect it, then it's vulnerable to
// XSS, so we reject the entire string.
if ( (majorVersion === 1 && minorVersion < 12) || (majorVersion === 2 && minorVersion < 2) ) {
var htmlRisky = html.replace(rxhtmlTag, "<$1></$2>");
if (htmlRisky !== html) {
// Even though htmlRisky and html are different strings, they might
// represent the same HTML structure once parsed, in which case,
// htmlRisky is actually safe. We can ask the browser to parse both
// to find out, but the browser can't parse table fragments (e.g., a
// root-level "<td>"), so we need to wrap them. We just need this
// technique to work on all supported browsers; we don't need to
// copy from the specific jQuery version we're using.
// @see https://github.com/jquery/jquery/blob/3.5.1/dist/jquery.js#L4939
var wrapMap = {
thead: [ 1, "<table>", "</table>" ],
col: [ 2, "<table><colgroup>", "</colgroup></table>" ],
tr: [ 2, "<table><tbody>", "</tbody></table>" ],
td: [ 3, "<table><tbody><tr>", "</tr></tbody></table>" ],
};
wrapMap.tbody = wrapMap.tfoot = wrapMap.colgroup = wrapMap.caption = wrapMap.thead;
wrapMap.th = wrapMap.td;
// Function to wrap HTML into something that a browser can parse.
// @see https://github.com/jquery/jquery/blob/3.5.1/dist/jquery.js#L5032
var getWrappedHtml = function (html) {
var wrap = wrapMap[tag];
if (wrap) {
html = wrap[1] + html + wrap[2];
}
return html;
};
// Function to return canonical HTML after parsing it. This parses
// only; it doesn't execute scripts.
// @see https://github.com/jquery/jquery-migrate/blob/3.3.0/src/jquery/manipulation.js#L5
var getParsedHtml = function (html) {
var doc = window.document.implementation.createHTMLDocument( "" );
doc.body.innerHTML = html;
return doc.body ? doc.body.innerHTML : '';
};
// If the browser couldn't parse either one successfully, or if
// htmlRisky parses differently than html, then html is vulnerable,
// so reject it.
var htmlParsed = getParsedHtml(getWrappedHtml(html));
var htmlRiskyParsed = getParsedHtml(getWrappedHtml(htmlRisky));
if (htmlRiskyParsed === '' || htmlParsed === '' || (htmlRiskyParsed !== htmlParsed)) {
html = '';
}
}
}
return html;
}
});
// Prior to jQuery 1.12 and 2.2, jQuery.clean(), jQuery.buildFragment(), and
// jQuery.fn.html() did not call jQuery.htmlPrefilter(), so we add that.
if ( (majorVersion === 1 && minorVersion < 12) || (majorVersion === 2 && minorVersion < 2) ) {
// Filter the HTML coming into jQuery.fn.html().
var fnOriginalHtml = jQuery.fn.html;
jQuery.fn.extend({
// @see https://github.com/jquery/jquery/blob/1.5/jquery.js#L5147
html: function (value) {
if (typeof value === "string") {
value = jQuery.htmlPrefilter(value);
}
// .html() can be called as a setter (with an argument) or as a getter
// (without an argument), so invoke fnOriginalHtml() the same way that
// we were invoked.
return fnOriginalHtml.apply(this, arguments.length ? [value] : []);
}
});
// The regular expression that jQuery uses to determine if a string is HTML.
// Used by both clean() and buildFragment().
// @see https://github.com/jquery/jquery/blob/1.5/jquery.js#L4960
var rhtml = /<|&#?\w+;/;
// Filter HTML coming into:
// - jQuery.clean() for versions prior to 1.9.
// - jQuery.buildFragment() for 1.9 and above.
//
// The looping constructs in the two functions might be essentially
// identical, but they're each expressed here in the way that most closely
// matches their original expression in jQuery, so that we filter all of
// the items and only the items that jQuery will treat as HTML strings.
if (majorVersion === 1 && minorVersion < 9) {
var originalClean = jQuery.clean;
jQuery.extend({
// @see https://github.com/jquery/jquery/blob/1.5/jquery.js#L5493
'clean': function (elems, context, fragment, scripts) {
for ( var i = 0, elem; (elem = elems[i]) != null; i++ ) {
if ( typeof elem === "string" && rhtml.test( elem ) ) {
elems[i] = elem = jQuery.htmlPrefilter(elem);
}
}
return originalClean.call(this, elems, context, fragment, scripts);
}
});
}
else {
var originalBuildFragment = jQuery.buildFragment;
jQuery.extend({
// @see https://github.com/jquery/jquery/blob/1.9.0/jquery.js#L6419
'buildFragment': function (elems, context, scripts, selection) {
var l = elems.length;
for ( var i = 0; i < l; i++ ) {
var elem = elems[i];
if (elem || elem === 0) {
if ( jQuery.type( elem ) !== "object" && rhtml.test( elem ) ) {
elems[i] = elem = jQuery.htmlPrefilter(elem);
}
}
}
return originalBuildFragment.call(this, elems, context, scripts, selection);
}
});
}
}
})(jQuery);